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The drive's firmware is responsible for remapping blocks, and so the OS can't really control what happens whenever the OS tries to permanently delete things by asking the drive nicely to do so. Consequently, if the drive decides it's best to remap the logical block silently while not deleting the cell contents, then the OS doesn't realise the data is still there. That's what the other SSD study noted.
On the other hand, in this situation, the thing doing the purging is the drive's firmware itself, not the OS, and the firmware knows for sure where the data is in the cells, and furthermore it's on a mission - to purge cells that it knows the filesystem is no longer using for data.
The purging that is being done here, is taking place with the specific intention of getting cells freshened up and ready to be written to in future without delay. Consequently we can reasonably expect that the drive firmware really *wants* to nuke cells that contain real data that is no longer needed according to the filesystem metadata since that's the only way to boost performance, and that's the GC's job.
If you want to check for yourself, try carrying out reads at the sector level yourself after running the experiment with the experimental setup described in the paper. You won't get much. |
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Ibas recommendation is that SSD disks containing classified information should yet not be discarded at this point in time. SSDs should rather be stored securely. Within 6 - 12 months the erasure industry is expected to release products that enables secure deletion of all information on SSDs.
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We have 2 sides to this issue.
1. SSD's firmware is clearing cell content, this makes it almost impossible for a user to recover accidentally deleted information.
2. SSD's leave miniscule traces of previous read write operations on a cell. Forensics experts say that this is harder to conceal than magnetic media.